Subjective Objective

“The limits of the “subjective” and “objective” worlds become for the first time really clear. One of the essential tasks performed by the general critique of knowledge is to ascertain the laws governing this delimitation in the purely theoretical sphere, where it is effected by the methods of scientific thought. This critique shows that the “subjective” and “objective” were not from the very beginning strictly separate spheres, fully defined in content, but that both became defined only in the process of cognition and in accordance with its methods and conditions. The categorical distinction between “I” and “not-I” proves to be an essential and constant function of theoretical thinking, whereas the manner in which this function is fulfilled, the boundary between the “subjective” and “objective” contents varies with the level of cognition. For theoretical science, the enduring and necessary elements in experience are “objective”—but which contents are said to be enduring and necessary depends on the general methodological standard applied to the experience and on the level of cognition at that time, that is, on the totality of its empirically and theoretically assured insights. Seen in this context, the way in which we apply the conceptual opposition of “subjective” and “objective” in giving form to the world of experience, in constructing nature, appears to be not so much the solution to the problem of cognition, as its perfect expression.” (Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Form, pp. 90-91.)

“But this opposition is manifested in all its richness and diversity only when we follow it beyond the limits of theoretical thinking and its specific concepts. Not only science, but language, myth, art and religion as well, provide the building stones from which the world of “reality” is constructed…” (Ibid., p. 91.)

“In its earliest formation, speech can equally well be interpreted as a pure expression of the inward or the outward, as an expression of mere subjectivity or mere objectivity. In the first case the spoken sound seems to be nothing other than an expression of excitement and emotion, in the second case it seems to be mere onomatopoeic imitation. The various speculations on the “origin of language” do indeed move between these two extremes, neither of which reach the core and essence of language itself. For what language designates and expresses is neither exclusively subjective nor exclusively objective; it effects a new mediation, a particular reciprocal relation between the two factors. Neither the mere discharge of emotion, nor the repetition of objective sound stimuli yields the characteristic meaning and form of language: language arises where the two ends are joined, so creating a new synthesis of “I” and “world.” An analogous relation is created in every truly independent and original function and consciousness. Art can no more be defined as the mere expression of inward life than as a reflection of the forms of outward reality; in it, too, the crucial and characteristic factor is to be sought in how, through it, the “subjective” and “objective,” pure emotion and pure form, merge with one another and so gain a new permanence and a new content.” (Ibid., pp. 92-93.)

See OntologicalAntitheses, SymbolIsm.

Crikey, what a lot of syllables! I tried to read this page out loud and I think I broke my tongue. Let's have a position statement please.

Yeah, let's have it. I find every third or fourth word of these quotes to be non-controversial, so I wouldn't mind having a rollicking good discourse in the vicinity of this topic. Lord knows I've *tried* talking to Cassirer, but he never returns my calls. (It was prolly something I said.) -- MichaelHill

I think, in brief, what he is saying is that 'the conceptual opposition of "subjective" and "objective"' is the perfect expression of the problem of cognition. Art cannot be defined exclusively in terms of subjective or objective, but only in terms of both. Art is a special instance of the use of SymbolIsm to communicate, and subjective and objective are united in the symbolic forms (language, art, myth, science). As far as I can tell, German writers are constitutionally incapable of saying anything briefly. --EdBuffaloe