Stolen Concept Fallacy Discussion

Most of this discussion is actually about ConceptsOutOfContext, which used to be called StolenConceptFallacy.

Edward has presented an epistemology to make sense of his claims. First I will counter the arguments Edward presents then object to his epistemology.

The sun is unearned is dealt with in UniverseOfDiscourse.
The sun is not good and not evil is in no way evidence that good and evil are inapplicable to inanimate objects. People can be neither good nor evil. Not both but neither. This is especially visible in depressed apathetic people who don't have any motivation. The concept of evil is inherently problematic and if there's a difficulty in applying it to inanimate objects then it's due solely to that fact. Evil is actually a useless concept even for describing humans.
There is no such thing as an "epistemological fallacy". In order of precedence there is formal epistemology (which can't be used for supporting this page), formal metaphysics and then informal epistemology. The epistemology proposed by EdwardKiser relies on the Assumption of Realism which reasonable people can reject. Some formal metaphysics built on the rejection of the Assumption of Realism end up contradicting all talk of 'domains'. And of course, those metaphysics trump Edward's epistemology.
What set of entities one is focused on when constructing a concept is irrelevant. Babies conceive of quantities by looking at fingers and coloured blocks. Does that mean that the concept of a discrete quantity is inapplicable to grains of wheat, apartments in buildings and molecules in a mole?
'Consult a dictionary' is not any kind of rational argument at all. It's preposterous handwaving and nothing more.
If in a discussion about software bugs, someone starts talking about insects, this is already a clear Fallacy of Relevance and no more. Disambiguating the two concepts involved is a trivial procedure in any actual discussion. This makes the concept of "epistemological fallacy" wholly redundant.
Yet again the FalseDichotomy of evil and good. Evil and good are not mutually exclusive concepts. One definition of evil is that an entity's selfish interests and impulses outweigh their selfless interests and impulses. The corresponding definition of good reverses what outweighs what. It is immediately clear that a person whose selfish and selfless interests are in perfect balance (however one defines balance) is neither evil nor good. Places and other inanimate objects naturally have that perfect balance since they lack both selfish and selfless interests. It isn't that good and evil are inapplicable just that they yield the predictable answer of 'neither good nor evil'.

On to epistemology:

(Originally written by EdwardKiser, revised by RichardKulisz)

A concept is a "handle" for a set of entities, qualities of objects, parts of objects, or collections of entities or objects -- in any case, a set. Given the huge set of entities you see at any time you can't form a concept for every possible subset of that set; there are too many subsets, and most of them are not particularly interesting. So your brain has to be picky about which subsets it decides to recognize as concepts.

Some objects stand out from others. This is differentiation. Then, objects that stood out fit together for some reason, and the other objects don't fit in with them. This is integration. Those objects are now members of an interesting set. That's a concept. To go beyond mere concepts, one assigns concepts labels and constructs definitions for them.

For example, 'red' identifies a quality in the visual field. Not red is the absence of this quality in an object. Color, as a concept, is an abstraction over red, blue, yellow, et cetera.

The above was correct in EdwardKiser's epistemology. What's been excluded was a shocking redefinition of the term 'definition' and a 'domains are fixed' view which is disproved below.

The above is only the foundation of an epistemology. If one were forced to consider it a complete epistemology then it would be unbearably primitive. Conspicuously lacking is any explanation of what a definition is (in the usual sense of the word) and especially of how humans go about constructing them. This is crucial because there is a process of Reflective Equilibrium between concepts and their definitions wherein both are continuously adjusted to better fit each other. All talk of Reflective Equilibrium is completely absent from Edward's epistemology despite the fact that it is crucial to all adult concept formation (any concept formation done after the acquisition of language). Now here's the kicker: what is the engine behind Reflective Equilibrium? What causes people to notice that a concept and its definition are out of alignment? It's the expansion of the domain to which people apply the concept. The DefinitionOfLife is a perfect example of this process at work. Completely inorganic and inanimate objects are considered to see whether the definition declares them living or non-living. Sometimes the definition is adjusted to better fit the concept but other times the concept is adjusted to better fit the definition. It depends on which is easiest and most useful at any particular point. And by the end of the process, the DefinitionOfLife has as its domain all objects and entities everywhere. Not even merely the whole of physical reality but also any conceivable reality.

Expanding the domain of a concept uncovers its flaws. People who want to support flawed concepts resist the expansion of their "domain of application". People who are merely unwilling to expend the effort of coming up with improved concepts and definitions should have no objection to others doing so. Arguing from the naive epistemology (arguing using StolenConceptFallacy) is dangerous at best since its purpose in limiting debate is usually destructive. For example, it seems to me that a proponent of the naive epistemology might easily reject the notion of artificial life and also of artificial intelligence as alive. They would most likely restrict their DefinitionOfLife to organic things and so they'd never come up with a decent definition of it. -- RichardKulisz

My epistemological presentation appeared "naïve" because I didn't have time to present it in full. It would take a very long time to do that. A full epistemology can only be developed by elaborating and refining a "naïve" epistemology. Everybody is naïve at some point.

Although I am not familiar with the term, it seems that "reflective equilibrium" captures the process by which human knowledge can grow and expand (including, of course, epistemological knowledge). However, if you "change" the domain for a concept, what you are really doing is creating a new domain for it and subsequently preferring it over the old one. The old domain can never be completely destroyed -- especially if there are some old writings somewhere that use the concept in its old domain.

For example, it used to be thought that A bloods were always compatible. I'm sure much research was done and written up under that assumption. Suddenly, though, this was found not to be true in all cases. Was it then "wrong?" Doctors could have thrown out the whole blood-type theory, in despair, on the grounds that it was "wrong." They did not. The context that they had then enabled them to infer that something heretofore undiscovered was at work. It was identified as the Rhesus factor, and the concept of "compatible" bloods was refined in the context of the Rhesus factor's existence.

However, the old research need not be thrown out, as long as people remember to read it knowing that, at the time, the Rhesus factor had not been discovered. When such a historic document says that bloods are "compatible," it is understood to mean it in a different domain or context than a (non-historic) research paper would use it today -- and that the old domain was unaware of the Rhesus factor. To assume that that old research applies verbatim in the current context, though, would be to commit the StolenConceptFallacy.

Another example might be seen in the case of a learning child. A child might think that fish are "animals that swim in water." A person whose knowledge was not much more significant than that probably named the "jellyfish." Later, the child learns that other things besides fish live in water, and that "jellyfish" are not true fish. However, the child does not lose the concept of "fish." He merely refines its domain.

No such discovery has been made which would justify the expansion of the context of "earned" and "unearned" to the entire universe. And if the concepts are nonsensical (which has been stated but not established), then to insist that "the sun is unearned" is also nonsensical.

How do you know whether something is "alive?" It is alive in comparison to that which is dead, or non-living ("dead" and "non-living" are not synonymous). What is the difference? That which is alive is complex (fire is too simple), and moves, and grows or proliferates (even if very slowly, like plants do) in such a way as to remain alive; a living thing actually seeks the things its life requires, within the limits of its nature. That which is dead or non-living does not seek anything. Can a machine be alive? Sure, if it is complex, and if it moves in such a way as to keep itself alive. Most machines built so far, though, move in order to fulfill the wishes of their creators, not to sustain themselves. That is why machines are not alive yet. -- EdwardKiser