Secular Humanism

Do any of the people involved in this discussion describe themselves as secular humanists? I have yet to find someone who applied it to themself. It appears to be a term applied to people who do not support teaching creationism in schools by those who do.

There's plenty of secular humanists out there, in contrast to religious humanists. But secular humanists rarely identify themselves as such because they usually consider the 'secular' redundant.

That seems to fit the above statement that secular humanist is a label mostly applied to others.

A very quick look at Google's 'humanism' category showed 'christian humanism' and 'religious humanism' (to my great surprise). They're not even close to the importance of the 'secular humanism' listing but they're there. Also, half the pages under 'secular humanism' actually described themselves as secular.

There is an explanation of humanism in all its complexity at http://www.jcn.com/humanism.html

See also GiveTheDogaBadName

Any worldview containing at least the following elements:

(from http://www.secularhumanism.org/intro/what.html)

Not really...

Secular humanists accept a world view or philosophy called naturalism (aka materialism), in which the physical laws of the universe are not superseded by non-material or supernatural entities such as demons, gods, or other "spiritual" beings outside the realm of the natural universe. Supernatural events such as miracles (in which physical laws are defied) and psi phenomena, such as ESP, telekinesis, etc., are not dismissed out of hand, but are viewed with a high degree of skepticism.

Furthermore ...

Most humanists prefer people to decide for themselves what to believe. They find that people who believe in the supernatural or spiritual range from the most brilliant to the most humble. Just as people who don't believe in such things. On the whole, humanists are more often on the receiving than the proffering end of intolerance, and have learned that it's better to assume nothing about people until without direct experience of them.

Odd that these two points,

should be listed so close to one another. The second point makes it hard to escape the conclusion that secular humanists have already chosen in favour of an ideology. -- ChrisSteinbach

Presumably, it's expected that an ideology based on facts and reasoning by each individual would be okay, but not one based on mysticism, traditions, superstition, etc. Specifying exactly what is acceptable would be difficult, but it's fairly easy to distinguish a dogma which is elaborate, seemingly arbitrary, and untestable from one which is simple, and requires only a few basic assumptions, and that's the type of choice you're generally faced with.

The arguments that reason is a type of faith or that science is a type of religion are old and tired, as well as baseless and stupid. Cut it out you two.

I didn't dispute this and I most certainly wouldn't. I am a firm supporter of science, and arguing against reason is just unreasonable. And yet I don't feel it allows me to say anything more than 'Reasoning critically has often helped me in the past' or 'Science has produced many wonderful results'. I can't bring myself to take the extra leap of faith and pronounce the superiority of science (if science itself compelled me to do that, then of course it would be a kind of religion).

What I do think is that, rather than offering to free people from dogmatism, the secular humanists appear to be offering a new dogma. This time based on objectivism and a preference towards science as a means of acquiring knowledge. They give no grounds other than faith, which they seem to despise, that this will help solve 'human problems' or answer 'important human questions' any faster than mysticism, opportunism, political pressures or anything else from the domain of human experience. To be consistent secular humanists should at least require that their own ideals be 'weighed and tested by each individual'. The outcome of this may well be preferable to ideologies of the past. But my reasoning is optimistic and not strictly critical. -- ChrisSteinbach

You're not such a firm supporter of science as you believe. If you were, you wouldn't assign slanderous meanings to the word 'science'.

What do you think science is if not that evidence is (at least potentially) weighed and tested by each individual? Science requires nothing more than the individual application of human reason. It isn't the product of the scientific community nor any kind of absurd "ScientificMethod". It's just reason applied individually. Any collective experience is just short-cutting. If you want an understanding of the nature of science from its historical context, see ScienceUsedToBeReligious.

If you think that the absolute superiority of science makes it a religion then you have a very strange notion of religion or a very strange notion of science. Does it make it a dogma that my reason compels me to pronounce the absolute superiority of reason? I don't think so. And I also don't think that science pronouncing itself superior makes it a religion.

Science is superior in the domain to which it applies. But 'true' and 'good' are not necessarily the same thing. Within the human context, religious belief has been shown to be a survival characteristic. This may be irrational, but then humans are irrational. As such, a belief in rationalism puts itself outside the human context to some extent. This becomes apparent when the realm of politics is involved. At that point both religion and science are equally prone to subversion by those who seek authority, and cannot claim any moral superiority.

Why should I, or anyone, accept irrationality as some immutable part of human nature? For anyone who adheres to honesty, it's clear that religion is dying out; it is not a survival characteristic.

And it is a blatant lie that religion and science are equally prone to subversion by those seeking authority. Authority is one of the defining characteristics of religion, whereas science promotes self-authority, and SecularHumanism is founded on self-authority.

Can you objectively say, that any grant guarantees freedom to discover information contrary to the purpose of the research? Imagine a scientist tasked with discovering alternative energy found out, in fact, there is none. Would he receive any further grants?

Science promotes self-authority, however peer-review inherently discourages self-authority among those not "trained in the field". To this end, science as held by those who deem themselves experts, is in fact a dogma, in the sense that they control the information presented in the formal education system. This is deemed necessary for the same reason that common language is necessary. However, it has promoted a culture that is very obstinate towards differing views. Because, anyone who disagrees, most likely disagrees for the same purpose as mentioned above, society is not allowed to view certain controversial research as falsifiable. To this end, once again, the current "field" of science is a dogma, escaping the fact that the purpose of science is necessarily the opposite. Just because a concept on paper has a certain definition, doesn't mean its application fits the original definition. (IE Socialism by definition is fair, but show me one instance of its ability to achieve its goals. Capitalism by definition is fair, but show me one instance of its ability to achieve its goals. What's the common denominator? Corrupt men.) Proof of concept: brontosaurus. A scientist desperate for a discovery, practically lies to make a claim. The Missing Link. A scientist desperate to find the missing link, builds an entire creature from a pig's tooth. Etc. This is by far *not common*, however it is far more common in controversial science than it need be.

Science as a concept is the pursuit of truth. Science as applied is the pursuit of a calculable model of truth. Therefore, science requires some faith that the model is correct. Just because facts reinforce the model, does not make the theory any more truth than facts reinforcing a debated historical event. Scientific study has no responsibility to be perfectly true, because when a model fails, it is allowed to remain true as a concept. Given a vague enough hypothesis, infinity revisions of a model could support it even if model has been inaccurate time and time again. However, any other dogma is not allowed to fail once, and is not allowed to be revised once. -- LeeLouviere

Let see where I've landed myself now. If I could start by answering some of the comments (paraphrased) from above:

There are many things I'm happy with or support. Sometimes just because I like them. Absolute superiority has never been a precondition for my support.

I disagree. Science has required ingenuity, opportunism, creativity, patience and many other things. Often it has required outright heroism. But I would say all these things could reasonably be applied by a human.

Most human activities would benefit from such attributes, but that doesn't make them absolutely essential (if very slow progress is tolerated).

They are essential. Kepler worked for six years to come up with a system that supported his pythagorian beliefs and matched the data painstakingly collected by Tycho Brahe. The success of this effort depended every bit as much on blood, sweat and tears as it did on human reason.

Here at least we really do agree. I wouldn't equate science with its products or with any one of the many proposed scientific methods. I see science as a tradition. It is more accurately described by its history, its participants, its general characteristics and by its products and methods. I see no reason to leave out part of the story.

No. Only if I must adhere to this claim before I am able to practice science. It is (currently) up to the scientific community to decide what science is and does. Only if its members are coerced into accepting the superiority of science as a fundamental truth, does it become a religion.

On a sidetrack, I understand that you have accepted this. But why? I would agree that science has excelled at helping solve a certain class of problems and I expect it will continue to do so. But these problems are surely not the only ones secular humanists consider important. Scientists wouldn't be at the top of my list of helpers if I had to resolve a dispute between warring nations.

Isn't it equally clear that there exists a whole grey area where it's not always clear what methods to apply to a certain problem. As a programmer choosing a sort routine, a scientific study might, for example, provide me with the routine which provides optimal performance. But my problem isn't that simple. Most noticeably it has time constraints, so I might DoTheSimplestThingThatCouldPossiblyWork. I don't think this is irrational. I don't think it is science either. -- ChrisSteinbach

I see science as a specific approach one takes towards reality. A specific meta-heuristic which selects those heuristics (scientific behaviours, methods and processes) that produce as accurate models as possible within the time available. It's no good if the model is perfect if it takes a million (or even infinite) years to develop and confirm it. So the whole point of this meta-heuristic is to solve the kind of problem you have above; choosing a sort routine within certain (computer and programmer) constraints.

Maybe I just call that science because that's the part that nobody has bothered to identify and name; perhaps a better term for it would be 'scientific attitude'. And as you pointed out, this attitude requires ingenuity, opportunism, creativity, patience and many other things. Whatever you call it, that's my partial answer to the question of the essential nature of science and until I get a better alternative I'll stick to it.

One of the consequences of my conception of science is that it must be true. How would you go about justifying an approach to reality? Pragmatism doesn't work because the 'science' meta-heuristic is the embodiment of pragmatism (so trying to justify science by pragmatism is circular reasoning). 'Reason' doesn't seem entirely sufficient, since a conception of reason broad enough to justify science would embody it in its conception (so more circular reasoning).

And yet, the truth of the scientific approach is obvious. If it is, then it must be axiomatic; an assumption. The best you could do is prove that the assumption is self-consistent, consistent with other assumptions, and self-fulfilling (eg, that a criterion for pragmatism be itself pragmatic, that a criterion for elegance be itself elegant, that a criterion for succinctness be itself succinct).

The only alternative to this I see is to justify science on the basis of psychological properties. This isn't formal and ultimately, I don't think it works. I think it only hides the justification for science as an assumption instead of replacing it.

Regarding your example of resolving a dispute between warring nations. Actually, I would call in the scientists; especially the psychologists. War is a psychological phenomenon with no rational basis.

Regarding support of science. I'd say that you're not a firm supporter of science because you support a conception of it that's subject to too many limitations (and hence is all too easily undermined). -- RichardKulisz

The only time I have really ever felt the need for a formal justification of science is when my view of it was impoverished by a formal definition. Otherwise I'm happy to appeal to peoples emotions or any mixture of things that comprise reasoning for justification.

I appreciate your acceptance of a heuristic as the basis of science. This is better, I would say, than introducing yet another ideology. I won't go so far as to say it is a good basis. It either suggests that science has only one aim or that use of a simple heuristic is enough to achieve any number of goals. Furthermore your own proposed meta-heuristic fails to account for much of what we would call science. The heliocentric motion of the planets lay dormant as an idea for years before supporting theories and evidence was found. The atomic theory, which dates back to ancient Greece, only found firm support as late as Einstein. The 'time available' in these cases really was indefinite. But I concede that a number of such heuristics could be helpful to scientists.

I think my 'warring nations' example holds up to your criticism. Your first contacts in a dispute of any size would be the main participants who may or may not be scientists. What goes on after that is rarely scientific and not necessarily successful. As a participant, you may decide to use your knowledge of psychology to influence the debate. This wouldn't lead me to characterize the proceedings as scientific.

I sense that you feel the need to crystalize the meaning ot Truth before you use the word. I really don't think you need to. I don't knowingly subscribe to any philosophy, but this has not left me disoriented. Most forms of relativism I am aware of are potentially just as dangerous as certain forms of absolutism have been. This doesn't stop me from believing that certain things are absolutely true, while other things only relatively true.

Finally, getting back to SecularHumanism. I only wished to point out that their own philosophy is not self-consistent. Their empowerment of the individual suggest a certain relativism. Their appeal to the facts implies objectivism. And somewhere on this page it says they accept naturalism. This is a pretty mixed-bag.

I also see them as trying to remove ideological contamination from their individual beliefs using science as their guide. This presupposes science is an objective measure of all ideoligies. Anyone care to clarify their thinking? -- ChrisSteinbach

The heliocentric motion of the planets lay dormant as an idea for years before supporting theories and evidence was found.

The provisional nature of scientific knowledge is not a defect. I don't care about getting a "true" model of reality as long as I have one that's good enough. It's in the nature of science to be quick and dirty. And this doesn't contradict science, or scientific knowledge, being true.

I don't understand your point in the warring states example. Are you claiming that war is good? Or that there is some kind of knowledge about the situation which can be achieved only without science? Or that there is some method to avoid war which outperforms applied science (especially applied psychology)?

Regarding truth. In fact, I don't believe in any absolute truth. Not even mathematical truth (excepting tautologies). I do believe in facts. Sad to say but even I have abandoned my policy of using 'correct' in place of 'true'. But this whole issue is a tangent whose relevance I don't see ....

Regarding SecularHumanism, I'm a good case study. I'm an absolutist who strongly believes in self-authority ("individualism" has repugnant connotations of selfishness).

As for naturalism, it goes hand in hand with self-authority. That's because every person who accepts the supernatural believes it to be superior to the natural world and accepts the authority of supernatural beings over natural beings. You have to believe in naturalism/materialism in order to believe in self-authority. -- rk

Re: Warring nations example.

Are you claiming that [...] there is some kind of knowledge about the situation which can be achieved only without science.

I am, at least, suggesting that this may be so. The claim that political problems must (eventually) give way to political methods and reasoning seems admissible. The burden of proof, as they say, is shifted to those who would say otherwise. Namely those who are petitioning for scientific superiority. I don't think my claim contradicts the possibility that science could or should influence a political debate. But other experts, such as historians, would have an equal chance of helping out.

To say that we never need to revert to non-scientific thinking is, just about, plausible. To go further and say that we should not must be nonsense. I regularly go a whole day achieving personal goals and conquering small tasks without doing anything recognizably scientific. To rob me of every approach except a scientific one would bring my life to a halt. I would cease to communicate efficiently. New problems and old problems in new contexts would leave me baffled if the empirical evidence was lacking. Lacking any a priori notion of a scientific method or reason would lead to an infinite regress in my thinking as I tried to choose one.

Your take on naturalism re: the supernatural is interesting. I'll give it some thought. Concerning your obsession with self-consistency. I believe, ultimately, it is not desirable. I'll have to respond to this some other time though. -- ChrisSteinbach

I don't think my claim contradicts the possibility that science could or should influence a political debate. But other experts, such as historians, would have an equal chance of helping out.

It's ironic you brought historians up. I dismiss the possibility of historians being useful precisely because of their status as (non-)scientists. Historians do not learn, nor do they ever aim to learn, anything useful from history (only about history). (To be precise, they have tried and have given up.) I contrast this sharply with psycho-historians who aim to construct psychological models of large-scale social behaviour and establish general laws of human behaviour from historical data. It would be very beneficial if applied psychologists then made use of these models and laws to predict and manipulate the diplomatic process. Diplomats and politicians should not be left to their own devices when war is the predictable result (which is the case often).

Another point with regard to historians is that they establish historical facts through the extensive use of scientific methods. (The problem is only that their data isn't useful unless it's further analyzed; the same applies to data from high-energy physics experiments which must ultimately be interpreted by theoretical physicists.) So if historians got some knowledge out of the warring states situation which other scientists did not, it would likely still owe to a scientific approach.

Your point with regards to the use of science in one's everyday life is very interesting. I should point out that such diverse activities as the application of oppression (Taylorism), and the dissemination of propaganda (advertising) have benefited from a scientific approach, even as the world has lost from their increased effectiveness. But your point remains; science is too costly an endeavour to apply on an individual basis. -- RichardKulisz

Ensuing discussion moved to HistoryIsntScience.

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